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a bstr act  This paper originated as the keynote address at the conference 
“Aesthetics Today” organized by the Finnish Society of Aesthetics to mark its 
40th anniversary and was delivered at the University of Helsinki on March 
1, 2012. Written for that particular occasion the sense of an oral presenta­
tion has been maintained. Shusterman’s point of departure is the thesis that 
contemporary aesthetics can be characterized by a number of leading themes 
that mark a return to older aesthetic perspectives, after these perspectives 
have been neglected in modern philosophical discussions. The paper briefly 
outlines and explores three of these themes whose increasing importance in 
current aesthetics can appeal to historical antecedents, namely: a focus on 
perception, the expansion of the aesthetic field beyond the philosophy of fine 
art, and the close connection of the aesthetic and the practical. After that, 
Shusterman formulates a fourth theme in aesthetics today which incorpo­
rates the first three and whose value for contemporary aesthetics he seeks to 
highlight, namely: the somatic, as exemplified by somaesthetics.
k ey wor ds  Shusterman, Pragmatist aesthetics, somaesthetics
I
This conference was convened to mark the 40th anniversary of the Finn-
ish Society of Aesthetics, and I am very honored to celebrate it with 
you, especially since it coincides with the twentieth anniversary of my 
book Pragmatist Aesthetics, and the fifteenth anniversary of its Finnish 
translation (happily still in print).1 There is, of course, a familiar logic in 
marking an aesthetic event of forty years ago with the conference title 
“Aesthetics Today,” but there is also a certain tension. If aesthetics has 
shown real progress, then it should not be what it used be, forty years 
ago, in 1972 when I was a student in Jerusalem working on analytic aes-
thetics, which was focusing at that time on the definition of art, the on-
tology of art works, and the logic of interpretation. Has aesthetics really 
progressed since then, and how? In some ways much of the discussion 
in analytic aesthetics seems fixated on the very same problems as in my 
student days, and it even seems to be recycling the same positions and 
debates with only minor variations. 
Take for example the question of interpretation. Now, just as then, 
the debate is essentially waged over whether the true meaning or inter-
pretation of the text is determined by the author, the implied author, or 
the reading public; now, just as then, we find the positions of objectiv-
ism and relativism debated, even if now these positions are qualified as 
being moderate or modest versions of intentionalism, relativism, or ob-
jectivism.2 My admired colleague Joseph Margolis – one of the original 
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contributors to these debates in the 1970s and still a prolific polemicist 
in them – has often told me, I hope jokingly, that he likes this continu-
ous recycling of the familiar questions in analytic aesthetics, because he 
can publish essentially the same arguments in papers today that he pub-
lished in papers more than forty years ago. Good philosophy may indeed 
be perennial, but I think that a discipline may be in danger of stagnation 
when past theories or approaches are continuously recycled in very short 
intervals of time. That is one reason why my aesthetic research began 
to look beyond the analytic aesthetics paradigm (valuable as it is) to in-
corporate ideas from pragmatism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, post-
structuralism, and East-Asian thought. I was striving for some kind of 
new philosophical synthesis, a new remix (in rap terminology) since all 
our philosophical ideas always already have some sort of mixed heritage.
I do not intend here to spoil this anniversary celebration by pessimisti-
cally complaining in the style of Ecclesiastes that “there is nothing new 
under the sun” and that our continuing research in aesthetics is merely 
an example of “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.” There may indeed be 
nothing in aesthetics today that is absolutely original without any his-
torical precedent or influence, but there are significant and promising 
transformations underway that offer renewed enrichment and innova-
tive insights. In fact, some of today’s most promising trends for moving 
aesthetics forward into the future reflect a new revaluation of key per-
spectives from its more distant past, a past long before what it was forty 
years ago. My thesis, then, is that contemporary aesthetics can be char-
acterized by a number of leading themes that mark a return to powerful 
older aesthetic perspectives, after a long period of modernity in which 
these perspectives were much diminished in philosophical discussion. I 
do not regard this as a decadent regression or arid recycling because the 
revived themes or perspectives are pursued with very different philo-
sophical methods, concepts, and styles than they were in that distant 
past and they often issue in very different claims or conclusions. 
In my paper I shall first outline three of these themes whose growing 
importance in aesthetics today can appeal to historical antecedents. In 
doing so, I do not mean to argue that their past prominence is a proof of 
their present value; instead I hope to improve our understanding of our 
aesthetic present by relating it to its past, while also illustrating how that 
rich past provides a wealth of resources that can be deployed in improv-
ing aesthetics for the future. After briefly exploring these three themes 
(each of them complex enough to warrant an entire lecture), I shall ar-
ticulate a fourth theme in aesthetics today that although not very promi-
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nent in traditional philosophical aesthetics is strongly implied in the first 
three historically prominent themes and whose value for contemporary 
aesthetics I seek to highlight. 
II
The first revived theme concerns the fundamental conception of aesthet-
ics as essentially defined by a focus on perception, including our percep-
tual capacities, perceptual practices, and perceptual experience. Alexan-
der Baumgarten, as we all know, founded the discipline of aesthetics by 
deriving its name from the Greek word for sensory perception “aisthesis” 
and by conceiving it as a general theory of sensory cognition. Aesthetics 
was meant to complement logic, the two together designed to provide a 
comprehensive theory of knowledge he termed Gnoseology. Though he 
regarded sensory perception as a lower faculty than conceptual thought, 
the project of aesthetics was designed to show how sensory perception 
(especially through its systematic cultivation) could nonetheless richly 
contribute to knowledge and improve not only our thinking but also our 
lives more generally, including (I cite his words) “the practical action of 
common life”. Defining aesthetics as “the science of sensory cognition,” 
Baumgarten further claims that the goal or “end of aesthetics is the per-
fection of sensory cognition as such.”3 
This perceptual definition of aesthetics was soon eclipsed by other con-
ceptions of the field. Aesthetics was soon primarily conceived as theory 
of taste, as we see in Hume and Kant. Though taste is obviously a form of 
perception, the focus of these theories of taste were primarily on critical 
judgments of beauty or other forms of aesthetic value (like the sublime) 
that were seen as different from mere sensory taste sensations; and the 
primary aim was providing a standard or mode of objectivity for such 
judgments.4 With Hegel this approach is superseded and aesthetics is re-
conceived as essentially concerned with the philosophy of fine art rather 
than with matters of taste. Hegel opens his influential introductory lec-
tures on aesthetics by pointing out that the term “aesthetics” is “so inap-
propriate” and “unsatisfactory” for the field he thinks it should designate, 
claiming instead that “the proper expression for [this] science is the ‘Phi-
losophy of Art, or, more definitely, the ‘Philosophy of Fine Art.’” Hegel 
then goes on to argue that what matters in fine art (and thus in aesthetics 
as the philosophy of fine art) is not the sensory perception of art forms 
and the appreciation of the pleasures they afford but rather the ideas that 
fine art expresses. These ideas and concepts are ones that bring to clear 
consciousness not our particular perceptions but rather “the most com-
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prehensive truths of the mind.” With Hegel aesthetics thus moves away 
from perception and toward conception; Aesthetics, he insists, is a “con-
sideration of [art] by means of thought, not to the end of stimulating art 
production, but in order to ascertain scientifically what art is.”5 
Hegel’s towering nineteenth-century figure cast its long influential 
shadow also onto twentieth-century aesthetics, even in the Anglo-Amer-
ican analytic tradition which has generally been so critical of his ideal-
ism and monism. Recall that this analytic tradition emerged in Britain 
from G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell’s rebellion against the prevailing 
neo-Hegelianism of the time.6 The Hegelian concept of aesthetics as the 
philosophy of fine art has nevertheless been the dominant conception of 
twentieth-century aesthetics, including analytic aesthetics. Major figures 
in this field (such as Arthur Danto and Joseph Margolis) often preferred 
to identify their work as philosophy of art rather than aesthetics. Fine 
art was certainly the dominant focus of the field, the key issues focus-
ing on the definition of art, the ontology and individual identity of art-
works, and the proper logic or methods for interpreting their meaning 
and establishing their value.7 The very notions of aesthetic experience 
and aesthetic attitude were strongly challenged (most notably by George 
Dickie); and even the strongest proponent of aesthetic experience, Mon-
roe Beardsley, defined art as its prime instance or source, and defined 
aesthetics in artistic terms as “the philosophy of criticism” (the key term 
which appears in the subtitle of his major book, Aesthetics: Problems in 
the Philosophy of Criticism, 1958).8
In short, the idea of aesthetics as concerned more generally with senso-
ry perception and experience was neglected. This was not only because of 
the narrower focus on fine art. Another crucial factor militating against 
aesthetics being concerned with perceptual experience was that such ex-
perience seemed too phenomenal, subjective, and elusive to satisfy the 
demands of an academic discipline aimed at generating real knowledge. 
Rather than experience or perception, analytic aesthetics felt it had to 
limit itself to the materiality of objects and events and to their mate-
rial representations in language, symbols, texts, or scores because only 
such material objects seemed able to ensure objectivity. This approach 
in aesthetics was part of a more general trend in philosophy to make 
language, rather than experience or ideas, the fundamental substance for 
philosophical analysis, because language seems more public, shared, and 
objective, while the mental states of experience or consciousness seemed 
too private, elusive and ephemeral.
In the last two decades, however, contemporary aesthetics is reviving 
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its original conception as focused on sensory perception. German philos-
ophers, as I see it, have provided the original impetus, notably Wolfgang 
Welsch and Gernot Böhme, neither of whose work I encountered until 
I came to Berlin as a Fulbright Professor in the mid-nineties. Welsch’s 
1987 book entitled Aisthesis, which seeks a rehabilitation of sensory per-
ception for aesthetics and for philosophy in general, goes even beyond 
Baumgarten and back to Aristotle to highlight perception’s crucial role. 
(The book’s subtitle is Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen 
Sinneslehre). His 1990 book Aesthetisches Denken made the same point, 
and elaborated aesthetic thinking as an especially effective way for under-
standing our contemporary reality. The case is restated in his Grenzgänge 
der Ästhetik (1996) and other texts. Gernot Böhme, a phenomenological 
thinker increasingly influential in aesthetics, likewise puts sensory per-
ception at the core of aesthetics along with the notion of atmosphere – 
understood as an elusive but powerful quality that hovers between the 
objective and subjective and that is grasped by aesthetic perception in 
books Aisthetik (2001) and Atmosphäre: Essays zur neuen Ästhetik (1995).9 
Unfortunately, the impact of these scholars on the Anglo-American 
aesthetics has been very limited. But in that arena too, though from other 
sources, we have seen a refocusing of aesthetics toward sensory percep-
tion, as for example in Carolyn Korsmeyer’s fine book of 1999 on taste.10 
My own project of somaesthetics, first introduced in German in 1996 
and then in English in 1997, expresses this trend of revaluing sensory 
perception for aesthetics.11 In elaborating the somaesthetic project I in-
voked Baumgarten for his focus on sensory perception but I also cri-
tiqued him by reconceiving the body as a perceptive soma in contrast 
to Baumgarten’s disregard for the body in his account of sensory per-
ception.12 Younger analytic scholars like Barbara Montero who explores 
“Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense” also exemplify this increasing 
interest in aesthetics as sensory perception that is essentially and dis-
tinctively embodied, as do philosophers like Mark Johnson who brings 
cognitive science to bear on aesthetic perception.13 What helps make this 
refocusing on perception more palatable in the Anglo-American analytic 
arena is the larger philosophical trend toward the privileging of philoso-
phy of mind over philosophy of language, compounded by philosophy 
of mind’s renewed interest in questions of consciousness and qualities 
of perceptual experience that are not reducible to language. Moreover, 
prominent neuroscientists have taken an interest in explaining through 
neural correlates the workings and logics of aesthetic perception. Thus, 
aesthetic experience – long regarded with suspicion for its phenomenal, 
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subjective character – is also getting more positive attention, after a pe-
riod which I described in the mid-nineties that heralded “The End of Aes-
thetic Experience,” to quote the title of a paper I published in The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism in 1997.
2. Aesthetic experience (with its sensory appreciative perception of 
aesthetic qualities) constitutes a far wider realm than the experience of 
art. And this brings us to our second key trend of aesthetics today, the ex-
pansion of the aesthetic field beyond the Hegelian paradigm of the phi-
losophy of fine art. There are several reasons for this change of perspec-
tive. There is the growing philosophical tedium (even when not explicitly 
expressed) of limiting aesthetics to fine art and the repeated rehashing of 
the issues of its definition, ontology, individuation of works, and the logic 
of their criticism. This discomfort is significantly heightened by two fac-
tors. First, so much influential contemporary fine art has been created 
expressly not for aesthetic appreciation but rather for political reasons or 
to make conceptual points, including the idea that art can be free of the 
aesthetic. Duchamp was an early pioneer here in explicitly designing his 
readymades to be aesthetically indifferent and claiming that “esthetic 
delectation” was inappropriate for such art.14 
The second factor is that aesthetics in common usage clearly has much 
wider application than fine art and that our world seems increasingly 
aestheticized in so many different areas and fields outside the artworld 
– from politics to commerce, urbanism, technology, and even health. 
Although this aestheticization of the Lebenswelt is often described as a 
distinctive feature of postmodern culture, we should remember that aes-
thetic approaches to ethics and politics is also a far older, pre-modern 
phenomenon.15 Nevertheless, as postmodernism has heightened our 
awareness of the pervasive aesthetic dimension of everyday life, it has 
become increasingly unconvincing to limit aesthetics to fine art. 
One obvious area into which aesthetics has expanded is environmen-
tal aesthetics, which partly signals a return to the concern with natural 
beauty, which was preeminent in pre-Hegelian aesthetics. Allan Carlson 
and Arnold Berleant are significant contributors to this trend in North 
America, as Gernot Böhme and Martin Seel are in Germany. Finland 
can certainly be proud of its own distinguished contributions to envi-
ronmental aesthetics, which goes beyond merely nature aesthetics to 
consider diverse dimensions of our human environment, an environ-
ment that is both in and more than nature. Already in 1999 Finland 
published a book entitled Aesthetics in the Human Environment, edited 
by Pauline von Bonsdorff and Arto Haapala and published by Finland’s 
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unique International Institute of Applied Aesthetics at Lahti, a book to 
which I was glad to contribute an essay.16 
Besides environmental aesthetics, I should mention at least two oth-
er notable areas where aesthetics has broken out of the confinement of 
fine art: the aesthetics of everyday life and the aesthetics of popular art. 
Finnish aesthetics has done very significant work in both of these areas, 
particularly in the former, I believe. There is perhaps no point then to be-
labor the fact that we find throughout the international field of aesthetics 
an increasing focus today on the aesthetics of the ordinary, and a wealth 
of article and book titles with phrases such as “aesthetics of everyday 
life,” “everyday aesthetics,” “aesthetics of the ordinary,” “the aesthetic in 
ordinary experience.” I have no time here to probe the complexity and 
insights of this rich field of research, but I should at least point out a basic 
ambiguity in the notion of everyday aesthetics, which contains two dif-
ferent conceptions or ways of aesthetically appreciating ordinary objects 
and events or commonplace, everyday practices. 
The first notion puts its emphasis on the ordinariness of the everyday, 
while the latter instead highlights the particular aesthetic character in 
which ordinary, everyday things can be appreciated through aesthetic 
perception and thus transfigured into a special experience. This second 
conception of everyday aesthetics emphasizes aesthetics’ root meaning 
of perception but also the important idea that aesthetic experience is a 
matter of conscious, concentrated attention that is essentially aware of it-
self as focused or heightened experience and whose object is the target of 
such explicit attentive consciousness and is appreciated as such. The first 
conception of everyday aesthetics is resolutely focused on appreciating 
the ordinary as ordinary, so the aesthetic quality or feeling appreciated 
in this first kind of everyday aesthetics would not call special attention 
to itself as an intense quality or powerful experience. It would instead be 
like appreciating dull weather with an ordinary, dull appreciation of its 
dullness, rather than a sudden spectacular vision or special experience of 
its dullness. In contrast, the second conception of everyday aesthetics is 
about the transfiguration of ordinary objects or humdrum commonplace 
events into a heightened perceptual experience that is characterized by 
explicit, intensified appreciative awareness. 
Perhaps these different conceptions are simply poles on a continuum, 
and are not mutually exclusive. While recognizing the validity of the 
first conception, I confess to find the second more useful if aesthetics is 
conceived melioristically as a field of study aimed at enriching our lives 
by providing improved perception and more rewarding aesthetic experi-
Back to the Future: Aesthetics Today
111
ence. From this perspective, aesthetic appreciation of ordinary objects 
and events serves to enhance and sharpen our perception of them so 
that we can derive from them the richest experience and most enlight-
ened perception they can offer. If this second approach seems paradoxi-
cal because its heightened perception renders the ordinary somehow ex-
traordinary in experience, there is also a paradox in the first conception; 
namely, if the everyday is experienced in the most ordinary, habitual, 
unconscious way, then how can one really speak of aesthetically appreci-
ating it at all, if there is no explicit awareness of the experience.
The second conception attractively offers an alternative to the principal 
path that fine art felt compelled to pursue to achieve the similar goal of 
rendering our perception more conscious, focused, and thus rendering our 
experience both richer and more memorable. That path plies the method 
of defamiliarization by making difficult. According to the Russian formal-
ist Viktor Shklovsky who formulated this method of “making strange,” the 
technique purposely “makes perception long and laborious,” because the 
perceptual process in art has a purpose all its own [is an aesthetic end in it-
self] and ought to be extended to the fullest.”17 Under lying this argument is 
the assumption that art’s aesthetic forms must be difficult in order to com-
pel the prolonged attention needed to render our perception of things more 
fully conscious and clear. One proven danger of this technique, however, 
is that such difficulty alienates art from the everyday lives of people. Such 
difficulty undemocratically confines art to a privileged elite, while also 
isolating it even from that elite’s praxis of everyday living. The awakened 
consciousness version of everyday aesthetics, I believe, offers the same sort 
of transfiguring intensity of awareness, perception, and feeling (and the 
enriched, more meaningful living this brings), but without high art’s alien-
ating difficulty and isolating elitism. Of course, this alternative path of en-
hanced, awakened perception of the ordinary, though it requires no special 
artistic erudition or access, has its own difficulty. For it requires some sort 
of discipline or askesis of perception, a special quality of attentive con-
sciousness or mindfulness, one that opens a vast domain of extraordinary 
beauty in the ordinary objects and events of everyday experience that can 
be transfigured by such mindful attention. Whether this transfigurative 
vision gives us not only beauty but also deeper ontological truth is a matter 
for speculation that I will not pursue here.18
There is another sort of ambiguity in the idea of everyday aesthet-
ics I should mention. Very often the term is applied to the aesthetics of 
activities that are part of everyday life in the sense that they belong to the 
real world rather than the artworld and are done by ordinary individuals 
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on a regular basis. The aesthetics of food, drink, fashion, and sports can 
be classified as everyday in this sense because we do eat, drink, and dress 
everyday and many of us also exercise very regularly, if not daily. But 
there are aesthetic experiences of such everyday activities that are mark-
edly different from the ordinary experience of them, and not simply be-
cause of a transfiguring quality of attention through special mindfulness 
but rather because of a special quality of the object or event being experi-
enced that can be classified as ordinary in a general sense of belonging to 
the real world of normal life rather than the artworld but also be extraor-
dinary in terms of its quality. Compare, for example, the discriminating 
tasting of an ordinary meal combo at Subway and an exquisite dinner 
with a superb wine; a humdrum frock and one’s favorite cocktail dress; 
a regular workout and an inspired aerobics class by a great instructor, an 
enjoyable episode of nightly lovemaking versus one that stands out as 
extraordinary because of its creativity, intensity, or meaning. 
Further analysis of the notion of everyday aesthetics is surely needed 
here, but I should move on to the aesthetics of popular art, which seems 
to command even more attention. When I first wrote about the aesthet-
ics of popular art – focusing on rap and funk in the late 1980s and early 
nineties – there was very little discussion of such topics. The situation 
has enormously changed. Not only does popular art appear as a distinct 
topic in the major Routledge, Blackwell, and Oxford companions to aes-
thetics, but it also issues in numerous book-length studies and antholo-
gies that either treat popular art as a whole (such as Noël Carroll’s Mass 
Art) or instead focus on particular popular art genres (usually of music 
or film). Interest in popular art is so great that it has spawned, since the 
year 2000, a series of anthologies entirely devoted to popular culture and 
philosophy, whose articles often include aesthetic issues of popular art. 
(Two of the first 8 volumes of this popular series with Open Court that 
now runs to more than 60 volumes were co-edited by former students of 
mine at Temple, Mark Conard and Aeon Skoble). And since 2007 there is 
another series on philosophy and pop culture published by Wiley-Black-
well with more than 30 volumes.
If the growing body of aesthetic theory in these areas reflects a libera-
tion from the exclusive cultural dominance of fine art, this does not entail 
a rejection of fine art’s enduring value and importance. Instead, aesthet-
ics can be more usefully pluralistic, devoting inquiry both to the most 
elevated fine arts and the most common everyday aesthetic practices and 
popular artistic forms. I argued for this pragmatic pluralism already in 
the first edition of Pragmatist Aesthetics in 1992, when I included a chap-
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ter on the high modernist art of T. S. Eliot’s poetry and another on the 
then new popular art of rap music.19 In reacting to misguided critiques 
that took the book’s interest in the aesthetics of popular art as a rejection 
of fine art, I formulated this pluralism even more explicitly by invoking 
the logical principle of inclusive disjunction: namely, an inclusive either/
or in which the acceptance of one of the disjunctive options does not 
entail a rejection or exclusion of the others.20
3. The third theme from aesthetics’ pre-modern past that has become 
prominent today is the close connection of the aesthetic and the practi-
cal, after two centuries of conceiving the aesthetic as essentially opposed 
to practicality and functionality. Kant’s formulation of this aesthetic/
practical contrast and his famous definition of the aesthetic in terms of 
disinterestedness and purposefulness without purpose have been tre-
mendously influential and in some ways very helpful for establishing 
art’s autonomy and defending its independence from ethical and politi-
cal dictates and from criteria of crass expediency or mercantile utility. 
Baumgarten’s original philosophical project of aesthetics, however, was 
practical in at least two senses. First, the goal was not mere descriptive 
truth for truth’s sake but involved the melioristic aim of improving sen-
sory perception not only to give “science” and “the liberal arts” “appropri-
ate materials” or “good foundations” to work with but also to make us 
better equipped to succeed “in the practical action of common life.” In 
short, aesthetics was designed as a normative project meant to be applied 
beyond its own practice and even beyond the domain of fine art. Sec-
ond, aesthetics did not merely consist of theorizing; it included practical 
exercises to cultivate improved sensory perception, which Baumgarten 
described as askesis or exercitatio aesthetica.21 Rather than mere contem-
plation, aesthetics meant action. 
In ancient times, the application of aesthetic training and perception 
for practical ends lies at the heart of Confucian ethics and politics, which 
rest on the twin aesthetic principles of art and ritual. In The Analects,22 
Confucius insists on the ethical importance of “achieving harmony” 
rather than mere obedience to fixed moral codes or commandments, and 
he likewise stresses the important ways that aesthetic practices such as 
music and ritual help establish and preserve such harmony (1.12). An ex-
emplary person who serves as a model for ethical conduct thus must be 
aesthetically shaped by attuning his character through “the rhythms of 
ritual propriety and music” (16:5). The Confucian linking of virtue with 
aesthetic appearance is further strengthened by its emphasizing the 
“proper countenance”, “demeanor, and “expression” that virtue should 
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display and that contributes to successful harmony (8:4). Entire passages 
of The Analects are thus devoted to describing the kind of bodily bearing, 
facial expression, and even clothing that demonstrates such virtue. 
Confucius emphasizes that virtue wields its power not by moral com-
mandments, threats, and punishments but by attraction that works 
through aesthetic means. “The exemplary person attracts friends through 
refinement, and thereby promotes virtuous conduct (ren)” (12.24) be-
cause one wants “to stand shoulder to shoulder with” such persons by 
being likewise virtuous (4.16–4.17). In the same way, Xunzi insists on 
the aesthetical-ethical power of music and ritual for shaping the person’s 
character and behavior into a more successfully harmonious form that 
contributes to the harmony of the wider social group.23 Xunzi clearly 
explains how ritual’s aesthetic practice combines the “full realization” 
of “both emotion and form” to achieve “pleasure and beauty” and instill 
the rationality of order and the knowledge of “the mean” (19.2c; 19.2d). 
Ritual’s aesthetic is eminently practical in not only nurturing and chan-
neling emotional expression but in formally shaping such emotional 
expression to be more fitting, balanced, ethically and socially appropri-
ate, and beautiful. It thus improves the inner character while also influ-
encing the conduct of others toward greater harmony. Xunzi therefore 
claims ritual as “the root of strength in the state” (15.4).  Similarly, he 
argues with respect to music that because it “purifies the inner mind”, 
“music is the most perfect method of bringing order to men” and thus has 
crucial ethical, social, and political importance (20.1; 20.3). 
Though Plato broadly condemned the mimetic arts of his time in Book 
X of The Republic, in earlier books of this dialogue and in his later work 
The Laws, he affirms the crucial role of beauty and art in creating the 
ethical character necessary for justice. Arguing that justice is essentially 
a mental virtue constituted by the ruling of the proper order in the hu-
man soul, Plato then projects that view of the right ruling order onto 
the public order of the state and insists that not only our intellects but 
our feelings and desires must be educated to discern and appreciate the 
right order, so that we will desire and love it. The harmonies of beauty 
are therefore advocated as crucially instrumental in such education (Re-
public 401–402). This idea has a long heritage in Western thought. Even 
after Kant (who recognized beauty as a symbol of morality), the idea of 
applying aesthetics to practical matters can still be found in Schiller’s On 
the Aesthetic Education of Man, where aesthetic perceptions are expressly 
invoked as the necessary key to ethical and political transformation. But 
the dominant post-Kantian line was to preserve aesthetics’ freedom from 
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functionality, an idea reinforced by nineteenth century fin-de-siècle art 
for art’s sake and twentieth-century modernism.
Today however, we see a renewed recognition of the practical import 
of aesthetics. Here in Finland, since the mid-nineties, this recognition 
has been institutionalized in the International Institute of Applied Aes-
thetics at Lahti (on whose international Board I have been proud to serve 
since its inception). But looking beyond this shining institutional exem-
plar, the practical is evident in several key areas of contemporary aesthet-
ics. It is expressed in the analyses of the practical arts of living (such as 
cooking, fashion, cosmetics, home decoration, and environmental design) 
that we already noted in everyday aesthetics. Besides these more specific 
aesthetic practices, there is the general art of living and stylization of self 
that Foucault helped make famous through his notion of aesthetics of 
existence and that Richard Rorty, Alexander Nehamas, and I have devel-
oped in different visions of the aesthetic life. 
These manifestations of the aesthetic-practical connection are essentially 
concerned with the ethical question of how to live in real life, but we should 
also realize that in contemporary aesthetics of fictional works of art there is 
increased discussion of the relevance of ethical matters to the work’s evalu-
ation. Moreover, contemporary aesthetics’ potent mix of aesthetics and poli-
tics can be seen in the emancipatory agenda of feminist aesthetics and black 
aesthetics, as well as some forms of pragmatist aesthetics. This political 
turn in philosophical aesthetics was largely inspired by the strong political 
turn in contemporary art in the eighties and nineties. Walter Benjamin is 
famous for noting how the mix of aesthetics and politics served fascism, 
but we should recall that he equally noted its use in communism’s efforts 
of revolutionary emancipation.24 In any case, whatever its political uses, 
aesthetics today can no longer deny its practical functionality.
III
I turn now to a fourth theme of contemporary aesthetics, one that incor-
porates (and I use this term pointedly) all three themes already discussed. 
This fourth theme is the somatic, as exemplified by the project of som-
aesthetics but also by other somatic approaches to aesthetics that are less 
global or more limited (for example, body-oriented feminist aesthetics; the 
aesthetics of sport as advocated by Hans Ulrich Gombrecht;25 or the embod-
ied cognition approach of Mark Johnson which has a more general scope 
but lacks a practical, meliorative component). How does this somatic turn, 
taking somaesthetics as our example, embody the first three themes?
First, the perceptual turn in aesthetics implies the somatic because 
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our sensory perception depends essentially on our bodily senses, not 
only the more familiar teleceptors or five traditional senses, but also 
more distinctively bodily senses such as those of proprioception and 
kinesthesia. Second, the somatic turn likewise reflects the extension 
of aesthetics beyond the realm of fine art. Consider the definition of 
somaesthetics as the critical, meliorative study of the body as a locus 
of sensory aesthetic appreciation and of creative self-fashioning. If the 
first part of this definition focuses on the somatic medium of sensory 
perceptions that we appreciate aesthetically and that are not limited 
to perceptions of works of art, the second part insists that our bodies 
are also media through which we can express ourselves aesthetically 
and create aesthetic experience that is replete with meaning not only 
for others but also for ourselves. Various activities associated with ev-
eryday aesthetics outside the artworld are covered in the scope of som-
aesthetics: practices of cosmetics, grooming, fashion, and, of course, 
various body disciplines that reshape our somas not only in terms of 
external form (such as dieting) but also with respect to our enduring 
but modifiable bodily schemata or dispositions that structure or guide 
our perceptions, feelings, and actions. Somaesthetic disciplines such 
as yoga or aerobics offer everyday practices that provide the inner aes-
thetic satisfactions of harmoniously structured and often intense body 
experiences but also provide ways of reshaping one’s external postural 
and gestural form in more aesthetically rewarding ways.
In going beyond the borders of fine art, contemporary aesthetics has 
had to become more interdisciplinary. I have not listed interdisciplinarity 
as a separate theme in this paper, because it seems more abstractly meth-
odological than the others, but it would not be unreasonable to name it as 
a trend in aesthetics today. For instance, in doing environmental aesthet-
ics (whether with respect to natural or densely constructed environments) 
include some geographical or ecological research or theories of urbanism. 
Likewise, in theorizing the aesthetics of personal appearance or the aes-
thetics of home decorations, one is led into sociology and cultural stud-
ies that illuminate the social meanings of our choices in taste. Why, for 
example, do people of certain cultural groups want to straighten their hair 
and lighten their skin, while those of other groups want to tan and get their 
hair permed? Tastes in what looks appetizing in food presentation, home 
decoration, or car design similarly will differ with different social classes, 
as Pierre Bourdieu’s studies have made evident. 
Moreover, to understand fully some of those food, home, or automotive 
choices it may be important to investigate factors of nutrition, social class, 
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political economy (including national or local economic interests), and en-
vironmental sustainability. To take one more example, appreciating the 
full aesthetic power and meaning of a given religious ritual may demand 
a thorough study of how that ritual is embedded in a specific ideology 
of religious belief and a particular network of community traditions. I 
am not merely making the simple point that the study of aesthetics goes 
beyond the mere look of things; I am also suggesting that the immediate 
perception or look of things is always already shaped by a cultural and 
cognitive background whose understanding is necessary for a full appre-
ciation of what that look is and means. Although I have argued that by 
going beyond the limits of fine art, the scope of aesthetic inquiry is also 
encouraged to be more interdisciplinary, I should insist that interdiscipli-
narity can also be wonderfully applied to the study of fine art, as Michael 
Baxandall and Serge Guilbaut have done in different ways with respect to 
Renaissance Italy and twentieth-century New York and Paris.26 
Interdisciplinarity is key to the conception of somaesthetics, though 
its roots are grounded in the discipline of philosophy, particularly prag-
matist aesthetics and the idea of philosophy as a way of life. Somaesthet-
ics must be interdisciplinary because understanding and cultivating the 
body’s use as a medium of sensory perception and creative self-expres-
sion can only be properly pursued by studying the body’s diverse roles 
and functions in different areas of life and also in the differing environ-
ments (both natural and social) that enable, constrain, and otherwise 
structure its experience and performance. Such study involves natural 
sciences such as anatomy and physiology but also, of course, the social 
sciences and the humanities and arts.
I return from the meta-theme of interdisciplinarity to the third major 
theme discussed earlier – the practical turn. It too is also expressed in 
the project of somaesthetics in several significant ways. First and most 
generally, the very concepts of practice and the practical necessarily imply 
action; and all human action requires the body. Besides this very abstract 
point, somaesthetics has practical import because actions can be per-
formed more effectively and gracefully through improved somaesthetic 
ability. Moreover, somaesthetics was explicitly conceived as a field of prac-
tice as well as theory. For this reason, besides the branches of analytic 
somaesthetics (concerned with descriptive facts and theory) and of prag-
matic somaesthetics (concerned with methods of somatic improvement), 
there is also the branch of practical somaesthetics that involves actual 
bodily practice rather than mere discourse about practice. For this same 
reason, I give practical workshops in somaesthetics and not just lectures 
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about it. One of these workshops was given here in Finland, in June 2009, 
at the Sibelius Academy’s center in Kuninkala near the maestro’s home in 
Järvenpää. Clips from a practical workshop I did with dancers in France 
are available at https://sites.google.com/site/somaesthetics/home/video-
clips. This practical work is crucial to somaesthetics as a meliorative disci-
pline aimed at improving not only our understanding of body conscious-
ness but also the acuity and performance of such consciousness and of the 
somatic behavior it guides. By my pragmatist lights, such improvement 
cannot be done simply through textual means alone. It requires practical 
somatic efforts beyond reading, writing, speaking, and listening, though 
all those discursive actions (which are also somatic) are also important for 
guiding the non-discursive practical body work. 
A further way that somaesthetics reflects the practical trend in aesthetics 
today is that the leading emancipatory political projects in aesthetics that 
highlight the practical stakes of aesthetic activism and aesthetic cultural 
legitimation are focused on race and gender, whose very concepts are based 
on the body and its appearance. There can be no gender identity or racial 
identity without a generic body image to signal that identity – even if that 
body image is an inaccurate stereotype. Ethnicity is also largely profiled 
through bodily style, whether this is in visual appearance (facial features 
and fashion) or bodily behavior (including gesture but also habits of eat-
ing, walking, etc.).27 The somaesthetics of race, gender, and ethnicity goes 
beyond external bodily form to recognize that also the subject’s own body 
consciousness (including her aesthetic tastes) are shaped by her sense of 
racial, gender, or ethnic identity, a sense that is often implicit. Heightened 
body consciousness can help the subject become more aware of these im-
plicit dimensions of her identity and taste; and such awareness is needed 
to transform implicit feelings, tastes, and behavior patterns, if the subject 
indeed wants to change herself or reform her habits in some way. 
Moreover, one’s own body consciousness can be developed to be more 
perceptive of our own implicit visceral reactions to ethnic others that can 
strongly influence our behavioral interaction without our knowing it. 
Many of our unfortunate, unintentional displays of racial or ethnic preju-
dice take this form, as I’ve argued in my book Body Consciousness.28 Be-
sides such problems of social interaction, somaesthetics can address a wide 
variety of practical problems in our daily living, ranging from overeating 
and poor digestion to back pain, accidents, slips of memory, and mistakes 
in typing. I address these issues in a paper called “Muscle Memory and the 
Somaesthetic Pathologies of Everyday Life,” which is revised in my Think-
ing through the Body (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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IV
I want to conclude my remarks by returning to the fine arts with which 
aesthetics has long been closely and beneficially connected. If aesthetics 
today has wisely rejected the Hegelian confinement to fine art, this does 
not mean that it should forsake that noble domain. In fact, a promising 
trend (less prominent than the others I’ve discussed but still discern-
ible) is the more active role that philosophical aesthetics is taking in the 
criticism, exposition, and production of contemporary art. Arthur Danto, 
certainly one of the great twentieth-century names in aesthetics, eventu-
ally combined his art theorizing with a career in the practice of art criti-
cism. My Chinese colleague Peng Feng, evolved from his appointment 
as professor of aesthetics at Peking University’s Philosophy Department 
to become one of China’s most important new art curators. His mag-
nificently successful pavilion at the 2011 Venice Biennale (which, by the 
way, was based on somaesthetics)29 led to the creation of an art criticism 
and theory department at Peking University, with him installed as its 
head. In the field of music, we have the example of Roger Scruton whose 
works in the philosophy of music are complemented by works of musical 
composition, including an opera. Arnold Berleant, well-known here in 
Finland, also combines his aesthetic theorizing with musical activities of 
composition and performance. 
As for myself, after being frequently questioned by countless artists 
about the relationship between somaesthetics and contemporary art, 
I decided that I needed to make the connection clearer by inserting 
myself into the field of art practice. The result has been a continuing 
collaboration with the Parisian artist Yann Toma in a series of photo-
graphic and cinematic works realized in various venues in France, Flor-
ida, and Cartagena, Colombia. This collaboration grew out of Yann’s 
interest in my writings in pragmatist aesthetics and somaesthetics, just 
as it also was spurred by my desire to realize one of the key ideas I 
have tried to advance since my conversion to pragmatist aesthetics in 
the late 1980s. The idea is that a philosopher of art should not be com-
pelled to be simply a passive observer or distanced, disinterested judge 
but rather should be welcome to display close engagement and caring 
activism in his or her approach to the arts. To do so may involve tak-
ing on the job of theoretical advocacy (such as I did with the aesthetic 
legitimation of rap music) or of practical criticism of contemporary art 
where in taking a stand one can contribute to the artworld’s reception 
of new art and thus perhaps also influence future artistic production. 
Such pragmatic activism may also involve curating shows or advising 
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artists and artworld institutions or collaborating with artists in pro-
ducing works of art – or even producing art oneself, inspired by one’s 
aesthetic theorizing. 
One form of such aesthetic activism that converges powerfully with 
somaesthetics is the aesthetic philosopher’s putting his or her own body 
not only into the cause of artistic reception and production but even 
into the artwork itself. This is the path I have taken in my photography 
and film collaborations with Yann Toma, where I appear in the somatic 
avatar of The Man in Gold, clothed in a shimmering gold Lycra body 
stocking. I have discussed this work, whose photographic dimension 
recalls Man Ray’s space writing, in some recent texts, one published in 
last year’s Montreal photography biennale catalogue and another in the 
recent special issue on photography in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism (February 2012).30 But here, to conclude, let me briefly share 
with you some images of this work, and thank you for your attention 
and understanding.
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